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PUBLIC TRIAL. EXCLUSION OF SPECTATORS.
Does the judge of a trial court, presiding in a criminal action,
have the power to exclude from the court-room all persons who
have no connection with the case at bar?
Defendant is indicted on a charge of rape, and at a stage where
the testimony is known to be of a decidedly loathsome and sala-
cious character, the judge presiding announces that the proceedings
will be continued in the small probate court-room, and directs the
sheriff to admit none therein except the jury, counsel, members of
the bar, newspaper men and one witness. The defendant's counsel
offers no objections, at the time, to the pursuance of such a course.
Such are substantially the facts upon which the appeal was based
in the case of State v. Hensley, 79 N. E. 462, recently decided in the
Supreme Court of Ohio, and it is held, in a very lucid opinion
by Spear, J., that such an order infringed the right of the accused to
"a speedy and public trial" as guaranteed to him by the Constitu-
tion, and that failure to protest at the time against the violation of
the right did not constitute a waiver of it. Like the right in case of
a felony to be tried by a jury, it cannot be waived or dispensed with
by mere silence.
This case presents questions of an exceedingly interesting nature,
and the reasons underlying its decision could profitably be studied
from the historical as well as from the legal standpoint. It has sel-
dom been passed upon by our courts and the text-books are nearly,
if not quite, barren of authority on the subject. There is neither
time nor space here to treat extensively the rise and development
of the right, but endeavor will be made to succinctly state a few of
the salient points relative thereto.
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It appears that under the Roman system of jurisprudence, 
pub-
licity at a trial was not a prerequisite to the validity 
of the proceed-
ings, and the taking of testimony in private was the 
rule rather than
the exception; and in the Ecclesiastical courts 
of England, and
wherever the procedure is found to be modelled after 
that of the
civil law, the situation seems to be the same. Under 
the common
law, however, the proposition seems to be well authenticated 
that
there existed such a right; a right recognized, perhaps, 
more in
theory than in practice, but nevertheless affirmed in 
several decisions.
Accordingly we find an early mention in Lilburne's Trial (1649) 4
How St. Tr. 1269, 1273, where a distinct claim 
is made by the
accused to it; and again, Justice Blackstone, in commenting 
on the
relative advantages and disadvantages of the various 
systems of
administering justice, states: "This open examination 
of witnesses
viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more 
conducive to
the clearing up of truth than the private and secret 
examination
taken down in writing before an officer or his clerk 
in the Ecclesiasti-
cal courts and all others that have borrowed their practice 
from the
civil law, where a witness may frequently depose 
that in private
which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and 
solemn tribunal."
3 Blackstones CoMM. 373. The cases of 
Collier v. Hicks, 2 B. &
Ad. 663, 668 and Danbury v. Cooper, io B. & C. 237, 240, 
also sub-
stantiate the statement above made. In 1848, the English 
Parlia-
ment passed an act which invested trial justices with a 
discretionary
power as to excluding spectators during the conduct 
of cases, if rea-
sons of expediency, morality or public policy demand it. 
St. ii and
12 Vict. C. 42, Section 19.
In this country, our progenitors, in order to secure inalienably
the right, embodied it in our Federal Constitution, 
(VI Amend-
ment), and most of the various states of the Union 
have incorpo-
rated in their Constitutions the same provision in substance, 
and in
the great majority of instances have adopted identical 
phraseology.
It has been held that the first ten amendments to the Federal 
Con-
stitution are primarily restrictions on the power of the 
Federal gov-
ernment only and not applicable in their provisions 
to the various
states. Hence it follows that the right to a "speedy 
and public
trial" therein guaranteed is restricted to prosecutions 
in the U. S.
Courts. Spier v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131, 166. If the 
marshall of a
district court, by order of the presiding judge, stands 
at the door
and in the exercise of his discretion as to proper persons 
to admit,
prevents the entrance of practically all negroes who present 
them-
selves, it is reversible error. U. S. v. Buck, 24 Fed. Cas. 
No. i468o.
No further interpretation than this has been placed upon 
what con-
stitutes a "public trial" within the meaning of the constitutional 
pro-
vision, by the Federal judiciary.
In the state courts the decisions as to the interpretation of 
similar
clauses in their respective constitutions, have been by no 
means har-
monious. To start with, there are three classes of cases: First,
-those in which the court excluded all persons except jury, 
officers,
defendant and counsel without any reservations or qualifications:
Second, those in which all persons were excluded, with 
aforesaid
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exceptions, but permission was given to accused to name any special
friends he desired to have present, who, it was stated, would be
allowed to remain: Third, those in which the court excluded a
certain portion of the audience such as children, "court loafers,"
etc.
Regarding the first class, such action, in view of the decisions,
would probably not be sustained by any court of review. In a
Texas case there were facts existing which at first blush would seem
to bring it under this category, but there the spectators were so bois-
terous as to completely obstruct the course of the trial, and the ones
causing the disturbance could not be separated or distinguished
from the others. All were excluded temporarily. Held, no error.
Grimniett v. State, 22 Tex. App. 36.
As to the second class, the decisions of two states at least are
irreconcilably at variance; the Supreme Court of New York hold-
ing such a course of proceeding not to be error, and the Supreme
Court of Michigan, that it is. In People v. Murray, 89 Mich. 276,
290, the court ordered an officer to stand at the door and admit none
but respectable citizens. A judgment of conviction rendered by
the lower court was reversed on this ground, and the statement was
made that it is not incumbent on the accused to show that he was
injured or prejudiced by such action. A constitutional right of his
has been invaded and that is sufficient; the law will conclusively
presume that injury resulted. It is not to be considered, the court
proceeds to state, as a wrong solely to the individual, the accused,
but the whole body politic is aggrieved thereby. In a later case,
where the court made an order that none should be admitted but
jury, court officers, counsel and whatever friends defendant desired,
it was held error, and a statute conferring such power on the court,
declared invalid. People v. Yeager, 113 lMich. 228. On practically
the same state of facts (but members of the press were here allowed
to remain) the New York court arrived at a contrary conclusion.
People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57. This latter view is also maintained
by the California Court. People v. Kerrigan, 73 Cal. 22.
Respecting the third class, the principal case, State v. Hensley,
supra, contains a dictum to the effect that such a course would be
fully justified and constitute no impairment of a constitutional right,
and the position is also supported by dicta in other cases and by at
least two eminent authorities, Judge Cooley and Professor Wig-
more, who both concur in the opinion that prudential reasons often
demand that youths of both sexes, "court room loafers" and those
attracted merely by a prurient curiosity should be rigorously ex-
cluded from the court-room in occasional cases. Ethical reasons
dictate such a course; public morality demands it. "A public trial
is not of necessity one to which the whole public is admitted, but it
is one so far open to all that the prisoner's friends and others who
may be inclined to watch the proceedings, in order to see that justice
is intelligently and impartiallyadministered, mayhave an opportunity
to do so. There may be and often is justifiable occasion to exclude
from a trial those who are inclined to attend from idle or morbid
curiosity only, and especially in cases involving loathsome or dis-
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gusting details." Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, 320.
See Wigmore on Evidence, Section 1834.
This constitutional provision so often found in no wise is appli-
cable in civil suits, and for this reason the New York Code of Civil
Procedure enacts that in all cases of divorce for certain enumerated
grounds, "the court may in its discretion exclude all persons not
directly interested except jurors, witnesses, and officers of the
court," and this appears to be a most salutary provision.
Abbott's Trial Brief for Criminal Cases, (N. Y.) lays down the
following: "The exclusion . . . of all persons other than those
interested in the case, where, from the character of the charge and
nature of the evidence, public morality would be injuriously affected.
does not violate the right to a public trial ;" but as we have seen, it
is extremely doubtful whether this proposition can be maintained on
grounds of logic or authority. It is stated too broadly. The
better opinion seems to be the one shared in by Judge Cooley and
Professor Wigmore to the effect that the sound discretion of the
court should control as to what spectators should be present, but
that the power should not and does not extend to a wholesale exclu-
sion of persons not directly interested. The presence of persons of
mature years and whose moral standards are not notably deficient,
exercises a wholesome effect upon the conduct of a trial, and to dis-
pense with general publicity in trials involving criminal offenses
would neither be expedient nor consonant with those principles of
liberty which permeate the whole fabric of our jurisprudence.
AMOUNT OF RECOVERY FOR UNLAWFUL DISCHARGE.
In a recent Louisiana case, Thurmond v. Skannal, reported in 42
So. 577, the plaintiff sued to recover the full amount of his stipu-
lated salary from the time of his unlawful discharge to the natural
end of his term of service. The action was brought before the term
was up, but the court held that he was entitled to the agreed salary
in full for the unexpired portion of his contract.
The question involved is not a new one and many decisions are
to be found as to the amount of recovery which seems to vary with
the nature of the action brought. An employee wrongfully dis-
charged is given a choice of three remedies; (I) He may
treat the contract as rescinded and sue on a quantum ineruit for the
value of the services rendered, or (2) he may sue for breach of
contract and recover his probable damages, or (3) he may wait until
the end of the term and sue for actual damages sustained. Colburn
v. Woodworth, 31 Barb. 381.
A leading case on this subject is that of Howard v. Daly, 61
N. Y. 362. Here a valid contract of employment was entered into,
and plaintiff was not allowed to begin his actual service; but this
fact does not affect the ruling in the principal case where the ser-
vice had already been entered upon. The court, in an opinion by
Dwight, C., says that it is important to decide whether the plaintiff
sues for wages on the basis of a constructive service, or for mere
damages. An actual performance will undoubtedly entitle the
plaintiff to her stipulated salary, but here there has been no per-
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formance of the contract. Disapproving the doctrine of a con-
structive service, (Gandell v. Pontigny, 4 Campb. 375), the court
says that a suit for wages as such is not maintainable, and damages
for breach of contract only may be recovered. 7 Ad. & Ell. 544.
Prima. facie, the amount of this recovery is the agreed salary. But
the plaintiff must make some reasonable effort to mitigate the dam-
ages which the defendant must pay by using reasonable diligence
in seeking some other similar employment. This rule is based upon
public policy, and tends to prevent a discharged employee from liv-
ing in idleness while drawing a salary.
Conceding the general rule to be true, that the party aggrieved
by a breach of any contract should make every effort to mitigate
his damages, it would seem to be only fair that a discharged em-
ployee should seek other similar work. And so it has been held
by the authorities that the defendant may show that the plaintiff has
obtained other employment or might have, with reasonable effort,
secured similar employment. Troy Fertilizer Co. v. Logan, 96 Ala.
619; Howson v. Mestayer, 14 Daly 83. It is true that some cases
lay down the rule of liability approved of in the principal case, but
on principle and sound policy, this rule should be taken, at the most,
as a prima facie measure of recovery. Hein v. Wolf, I E. 0. S.
(N. Y.) 70; King v. Staren, 44 Pa. 99; Jones v. Jones, 2 Swan
(Tenn.) 605. In all fairness, however, the defendant should be
required to assume the burden of proof in an attempt of this nature
to decrease his liability. Fan Winkle v. Satterfield, 58 Ark. 617;
Horn v. Western Land Association, 22 Minn. 233; Emery v.
Steckel, 126 Pa. 171; Barker v. Knickerbocker Ins. Co., 24 Wis.
630; Owen v. Union Match Co., 48 Mich. 348; Williams v. Ander-
son, 9 Minn. 50; Cuinberland & P. R. Co. v. Slack, 45 Md. I6I.
In considering the law on this subject in Louisiana, Art. 272o
of the code of that state must be taken into account. This section
provides that the discharge of an employee under these circum-
stances vests in him at once all his unearned salary; and the fact
that he has secured other employment makes no difference. Sh&r-
burn v. Orleans Cotton Press, 15 La. 360. Thus by means of this
statute and decision, the very evil and injustice, which other courts
have prevented by allowing mitigating defenses, is fostered and
encouraged. In such cases the law only aims at compensation, and
such defenses tend to obtain it and no more. Any person guilty of
a breach of a contract should only be required to pay actual dam-
ages. The rule in Louisiana places an employee discharged with-
out cause in the enviable position of drawing a salary while idle or
engaging in other employment and perhaps earning double what he
is worth, in an economic sense, to the community. Plainly such a
rule is contrary to both policy and authority.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. PAROL MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT.
The Supreme Court of Illinois in a recent decision (Kissack et
al. v. Burke, 79 N. E. 619) decides the point, inter alia, that when
one party makes an offer to another in writing, to sell land, with a
proviso that it be accepted within a certain time, a parol agreement
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to extend such period of acceptance is not void, and in the event
that the other party is ready, able and willing to perform his portion
of the contract before the expiration of the time verbally stipulated,
he may maintain a bill in equity for a conveyance of the land. It
was strongly urged by appellees that the extension not being in writ-
ing, was entirely inoperative, as offending the Statute of Frauds,
and that the rights of the appellant were concluded by his not hav-
ing accepted the contract in its original form, but they were not sus-
tained in their contention.
Authority may be found on either side of this proposition. At
common law, of course, the terms of a written contract cannot be
varied, added to or subtracted from by parol evidence. But in case
the parties agree to alter it in some essential particular by a subse-
quent agreement, the old contract is discharged, a new one formed,
and an action may be maintained upon this new verbal contract.
But a different question is presented when the original was such as
was required to be in writing. Then the substituted agreement is
invalid, and the query is whether the original, with a parol modifi-
cation engrafted upon it, is capable of enforcement.
At first the courts began to differentiate the cases on the ground
of whether the particular in regard to which the contract was
changed was a material one or not, Stead v. Dawber, IO Adol. &
Ell. 57, but this finds no countenance in the later cases. Then there
are a number of decisions in which it is held that such a contract is
invalid. Goss v. Lord Nugent, 2 Nev. & Man. 33, 34; Harvey
v. Grabham, 5 Adol. & Ell. 61, 73; Hasbrouck v. Tappen, 15 John.
200; Doar v. Gibbs, i Bailey Eq. (S. C.) 371. The following
statement is made in American & Erg. Cyc. of Law (2 Ed. Vol. 29,
825) : "If any alteration is made, so that part of the contract has
to be proved by oral evidence, it ceases to be a contract in writing,
and is thus exposed to all the evils which the statute was intended
to remedy. Within the rule, the time of performance cannot be
extended or changed by parol, nor the time within which the con-
tract is to be completed by an acceptance by one of the parties."
Thus where a party orally agreed to "carry" goods for a longer
time than the contract specified, only -the terms of the original con-
tract could be considered as binding upon the parties. Clark v.
Fey, 121 N. Y. 47 o . A case arose in Wisconsin on a state of facts
analogous to those in the main case (cited supra) and it was
adjudged that the verbal extension of the time for acceptance could
not be considered effective, and it is there stated: "Where the law
requires a contract to be in writing in order to bind the parties, and
the writing signed and produced in evidence shows that the con-
tract signed by the party who is to be bound by it is to be com-
pleted by an acceptance of the other party within a limited time, it
is incompetent to show by parol evidence that the time for its com-
pletion, by such acceptance, was extended to some other date not
mentioned in the contract signed by the party to be bound. The
acceptance of the party after the time fixed in the written contract.
which is to bind the party signing it, does not show that the contract
in writing was the contract between the parties, but an entirely
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different contract, and so the contract actually made by an accept-
ance, after the time fixed in the writing, is a contract not in writing,
and so void under the statute." Atlee v. Bartholomew, 69 Wis. 43,
50. Numerous cases can be cited which take the opposite ground.
See cases cited in 20 Cyc., page 288, note 74; and 23 Cent. Dig., tit.
"Frauds, Statute of," Section 284.
In this apparently irreconcilable conflict of decisions, there is
one rule to be deduced which will materially aid in harmonizing
many of them, and that is :--When the written agreement as altered
by the parol modification is declared upon, the action will not be
sustained as this would be going in the teeth of the statute, but
where the original agreement, and that alone, is the foundation of
the action, then the substituted or altered term may be relied upon
by way of accord and satisfaction, as performance or readiness to
perform under the terms of the parol variation is equivalent to per-
formance or readiness to perform under the contract as written;
and it is held that proof of such will not constitute a variance from
the declaration. Steam v. Hall, 9 Cush. 31; Whittier v. Dana, io
Allen 326; Browne on Statute of Frauds (2 Ed.) Section 423, 425,
and cases there cited. Cummings v. Arnold, 3 Met. 486, holds that
in defense to an action on a written contract, the defendant may
show that he has performed it according to an oral agreement for a
substituted performance, or, being ready to do so, was prevented
by an act of the plaintiff. So by this method effect is given to an
oral change in the manner or time of performance without contra-
vening the terms of the Statute of Frauds.
The question is often involved in contracts for the sale of goods
which come within the purview of the statute and a verbal altera-
tion is made as to the time of performance, etc. In such cases, the
courts show much reluctance, and justly so, in allowing the statute
to be interposed as a defense and thereby constituting themselves
innocent means in the perpetration of a fraud. Endeavor is con-
stantly shown to obviate the rigidity of this rule of law and not to
extend its scope but rather to mollify its effect. Reasons of expe-
diency and justice, in its widest and primary sense, demand such a
course; otherwise that which was intended for the prevention of
wrong might become an engine for its accomplishment.
In many cases the equitable doctrine of estoppel may be invoked.
Thus it is stated by the Illinois court in the case under consideration:
"In equity, a party is not permitted to deceive and defraud another
by agreeing to such an extension, and then disregard it, and thus
gain an unjust and inequitable advantage," citing Thayer v. Meeker,
86 Ill. 470, 473.
The principal decision is not only in accord with a large line of
cases, but is also commendable on other grounds.
EXTRADITION. HABEAS CORPUS.
The scope and limitations of the federal laws relating to inter-
state extradition are quite clearly expounded in Pettibone v. Nichols,
203 U. S. 192, decided Dec. 3, i9o6. Pettibone was arrested in Col-
orado in accord with a requisition from the governor of Idaho,
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taken to Idaho by its authorized agent and there held in custody in
the state prison on a charge of murder committed in Idaho. Petti-
bone made application for a writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal
the facts sufficiently alleged in the application were treated.as true
in their legal bearing on whether the detention was in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States. In this application
Pettibone alleged that he had not been in the state of Idaho for
more than ten years prior to the act complained of, and that the gov-
ernor of Idaho knew that he had not been in the state at the time
of the commission of the crime nor at any time near that day. He
further alleged that there was a conspiracy between the governor
of Idaho and his legal advisors and the governor of Colorado to
prevent the accused from asserting his constitutional right under
the Constitution (Cl. 2, Sec. 2, Art. 4) and the act pursuant thereof.
(Sec. 5278 Rev. Stat.) The execution of the conspiracy was set
out and was in substance, that by arrangement he was secretly
arrested late Saturday night, and that early Sunday morning he was
hurried out of the state of Colorado, on a special train making fast
time, by the officers of the state and "certain armed guards being
part of the militia of the state of Colorado." He was given no
chance to communicate with friends or counsel although he
requested opportunity to so communicate. In Idaho he was held
charged with the murder of one Steunenberg by throwing an explo-
sive bomb at and against his person. At the earliest opportunity
application was made for the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme
Court of Idaho, the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Idaho, and the United States Supreme Court, McKenna J., dissent-
ing, refused to discharge the accused. Mr. Justice Harlan delivered
the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court. In considering the arrest
in Colorado he says, "we do not perceive that anything done there,
however hastily and inconsiderately done, can be adjudged to be in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." As
this man was held for trial under an indictment in one of the courts
of Idaho for the crime of murder, charged to have been committed
in that state against its laws, his custody was by due process of law.
The courts uniformly held that, "his imprisonment was not illegal
unless his extradition makes it so, and as an illegal extradition is
no greater violation of his rights of person than his forcible abduc-
tion, if forcible abduction from another state and conveyance within
the jurisdiction of the court holding him is no objection to his deten-
tion and trial for the offense charged, as held in Ker v. Illiois, 119
U. S. 437, and in Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 712, no more is the
objection allowed if the abduction has been accomplished under the
forms of law." In re Moore, 75 Fed. Rep. 821.
The discretionary power of a governor in preparing requisition
papers and in granting warrants for arrest upon such papers is gen-
erally recognized. The governor's action establishes a prima facie
case or presumption that all essential prerequisites have been
observed. If uncontroverted in such a proceeding as habeas corpus
such a presumption becomes conclusive evidence of the right to
extradite the person charged. People ex rel. Hamilton v. Police
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Com. of City of New York, 91 N. Y. Sup. 76o; Cook v. Hart, 146
U. S. 183; ex parte Reggel, ix4 U. S. 642. By the method of arrest
and deportation from Colorado the accused was deprived of all
opportunity to invoke judicial aid. Had he succeeded in obtaining
a writ of habeas corpus in Colorado there is no doubt but that he
could have successfully interposed that he was not a fugitive from
justice under the terms of the federal statute and Constitution.
Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean 132. Mr. Justice McKenna in his dis-
senting opinion says, "The foundation of extradition between states
is that the accused should be a fugitive from justice from the
demanding state, and he may challenge the fact by habeas corpus
immediately upon his arrest. If he refute the fact he cannot be
removed. Hyatt v. Cockran, 198 U. S. 691. And the right to
resist removal is not a right of asylum. To call it so in the state
where the accused is, is misleading. It is-the right to be free from
molestation. It is the right of personal liberty in its most complete
sense." As Mr. Justice Harlan suggests, Congress might provide
for the compulsory return to the state of parties wrongfully abducted
from its territory on application of the parties or of the state. But
Congress has not seen fit to add to nor change the existing law.
The zeal which prompts the bringing of criminals to justice is
commendable. But in the exercise of such zeal the safety of the
public demands that no means shall be used which are against the
intent of federal law. In the present case a man's right to personal
security as guaranteed by the federal law is infringed by a legal
abduction. This seems an anomoly. It would technically be a legal
crime if there could be such a thing. The inadequacy of the law
to prevent such abduction is a menace to the personal security and
liberty of all citizens of the United States. In our treaty with Great
Britain provision is made assuring every person for whom requisi-
tion is made, a hearing before the court issuing the warrant of
arrest. Thus opportunity to claim any just defense is given. Ash-
burton Treaty (1842). Considering the great extent of our country
such a safeguard would be equally warranted, and would be but a
reasonable protection to citizens of any state against being sur-
prised and subjected to deportation, possibly from coast to coast
or even to the Philippines.
ON TIHE RIGHT OF A "WALKING DELEGATE" OR "BUSINESS AGENT" TO
ORDER MEN OUT ON STRIKE.
For many years the courts have been endeavoring to find some
solid ground on which to decide the respective rights of employer
and employee during labor troubles. Adding to this the problem of
the rights of interested third parties, sympathizers, would-be patrons
and last of all the duties of the belligerents to the general public a
situation then arises which requires the utmost care and study in
attempting to conserve the rights of all and wrong none.
In the case of Booth v. Burgess, 65 Atl. 226, Vice-Chancellor
Stevenson of the New Jersey Court of Chancery has contributed a
remarkably well-written and clear opinion. In this case a boycott
349
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was ordered, not by anyone directly interested, but on direction of a
business agent or walking delegate who was the representative of a
federation of building trades numbering about 2,5oo men. The
number of men who were actually engaged in dispute with their
employer was about twenty-five. It was not questioned that the
union to which these men belonged, or its members acting individ-
ually refused to deal with the complainant. The right of any mem-
ber to so bind himself that he might, against his own desire, be
ordered or "instructed" to leave his employment for the advance-
ment of the aims of independent associations was denied. The
decision goes on the right of everyone to a "free market" recog-
nizing, at the same time, the idea of legitimate competition even
when carried to great lengths as in the Mogul v. McGregor case.
(23 Q. B. Div. 598.) The terms "malicious" and "unlawful" which
have proved such a stumbling block in former cases have been
treated with scant notice in the principal case. In this connection
it is important and interesting to notice the successive stages by
'which the general question of strike and boycott has developed.
In Allen v. Flood, App. Cas. I (1898), the jury found that i.
Allen "maliciously" induced the Glengall company to discharge
Flood and 2. Allen "maliciously" induced the Glengall company not
to engage Flood and 3. that damage was done to the extent of
twenty pounds. When the House of Lords, on appeal, decided,
after much discussion, that Allen was not liable it seems that the
most important fact in the case, i. e., whether the men "would knock
off" or "be called out" was still undecided. Naturally, if Allen's
statement was that the men would (of their own volition) "knock
off" he would not be liable, while if it was that they would be "called
out" (leaving the question of volition open to inquiry) the case
would not be so plain. In Quinn v. Leathem (19Ol) A. C. 5o6
(atp. 542) Lord Lindley denied emphatically the right of a union
to make use of the boycott and in this connection should be con-
sidered the dissenting opinion of so great an authority-as Mr. Justice
Holmes in the case of Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 504: "I think it
is lawful for a body of workmen to try by combination to get more
than they are now getting, although they do it at the expense of
their fellows and to said end to strengthen their union by the boycott
and the strike." It will be recalled that the majority in this case
held the strike unlawful on the ground that it was unlawful to use
this means of compelling a rival union to amalgamate with them
coupled with the fear that violence, etc., would ensue. The Plant
case can hardly be considered a strong decision. In Jersey City v.
Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 764, (also decided by V. C. Stevenson) the
court was perplexed to know how an injunction would issue to pro-
tect men who were interfered with in ,uest of employment and
sought no redress themselves-the would-be employer bein. the
complainant. The same ar.Ytinr-ent was advanced by the defendants
as that advanced by the defendants in Quinn v. Leathem.-sypra.
that the complainant could have no redress or protection for injury
to the'asserted right to deal at will as opposed to damage caused by
the breaking of an actual contract. This was met b" the "right to
COMMENT
a free market" idea in line with Lord Ellenborough's suggestion of
a right to a "possible expectancy." The New York state courts
have attempted to decide whether a union may make an agreement
with an employer that, on consideration that he will employ only
members of a certain union and expel all other tradesmen of the
same kind who are not members, it will, in return, keep him supplied
with men and ward off strikes for a certain period, a sort of offen-
sive and defensive alliance. In Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 37,
where non-members of the union were discharged by force of the
agreement, Judge Gray says "the effectuation of such a purpose
would conflict with that principle of public policy which prohibits
monopolies and exclusive privileges." In a later case, Jacobs v.
Cohen, 183 N. Y. 211, an agreement substantially the same existed
but the action was to recover on a note given by the employer as
security for his performance of the agreement. Judge Gray there
said: "This case is not within Curran v. Galen. If it might operate
to prevent some persons from being employed by the firm or, per-
haps, from remaining in the firm's employment, that is but an inci-
dental feature" and (p. 215) "if they (the employers) regarded it
(the agreement to give the note) for their benefit to do so does it
lie in their mouths, now, to urge the illegality?" After studying
the two cases it is rather difficult to understand why the agreement
should be agreeable to public policy when the subject of controversy
was between the parties and without the pale when attacked by the
injured party directly.
The case of Temperton v. Russell (1893) I Q. B. 715, was
almost analogous to the present case under discussion. There an
agent representing a joint committee of a federation of unions
coerced an employer by threats of strike to break a contract with
complainant who was on the "unfair" list.- Lord Esher (p. 725)
said "as between themselves the members of the union had a per-
fect right to do that (threaten to and actually strike, etc.) and to
bind themselves to comply with such rules. But these rules cannot
bind any person who did not belong to such union" and "there is
no distinction between inducing a person to break a contract and
(inducing him) not to enter into a contract." This is the same idea
referred to previously as a "probable expectancy."
In Nat. Prot. Assn. v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 331, Parker, C. J.,
said, "A labor organization is endowed with precisely the same legal
right as an individual to threaten to do that which it may lawfully
do." This case is a clear and avowed affirmation of the right to
strike.
A summary of the cases indicates that under the law as now
understood, one or one thousand may unite, whether such union be
called "conspiracy" or other technical name, and not only refuse to
enter into or continue in the employ of a master but may name the
terms on which the relation shall commence or continue. That
these terms seem founded on good or bad motives or that they may
interfere with the employment of others at that place and under that
master is immaterial. It seems to be denied that a number of such
unions may, through federation with other trade councils, force the
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members who have no direct concern in a quarrel to obey the order
of a delegated official to leave or refuse to enter the employment of
a black-list~d employer-even though these employees may have
agreed to this very thing on becoming members of their individual
unions. It is of course a well-known fact that such agreements
exist among the employers and are generally cheerfully carried out.
The principal case, in line with Temperton v. Russell (1893),
QB. 713, holds that, even if an individual member be willing, that
it is against public policy and violating the right of "free market"
to allow him to so bind himself.
